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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
NORMA LOIS COOPER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs
FORESTERS UNDERWRITERS, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S
REPLY
BRIEF
Case No. 7941

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent has included in her Statement of
Facts what purports to be a Stipulation contained
in the record which came up from the City Court.
No formal Stipulation was entered into in the City
Court. After a discussion in a pretrial hearing
before Judge J. Patton Neeley, a written memorandum was filed by each of the parties, which contained his version of the facts. The quotation on
Pages 2 and 3 of Respondent's Brief is taken from
a draft of a proposed Stipulation prepared by Re-
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spondent, but which was never executed or agreed
to by Appellant. The so-called "fuller Statement of
Facts" referred to by Respondent was not agreed to
at the time this matter was before the District Court,
is not a part of the record on appeal and can not
be considered by this Court on this appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

THE QUESTION OF WAIVER IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT.
II
THE RIGHT OF FORFEITURE WAS NOT
WAIVED.
ARGUMENT
I

THE QUESTION OF WAIVER IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT.
Respondent has tried to enlarge on the facts
in an attempt to have this Court consider the question of waiver. As stated heretofore, the "fuller
Statement of Facts" of Respondent is not a part of
the record ~nd not before the Court. There is
nothing whatever in the record which is before the
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Court which goes to the question of waiver. This
case should be decided on the issues raised in Appellant's Brief.
II
THE RIGHT OF FORFEITURE WAS NOT
WAIVED.
Notwithstanding Appellant's contention that
the record excludes a consideration of the question
of waiver, should this Court for any reason do so,
then Appellant maintains there was no waiver either
in fact or law.
The circumstances relied upon by Respondent
to establish waiver are: The first premium was paid
in the afternoon of March 31, 1951, and coverage
started at noon of that day; that the payments on
October 1, 1951, and October 31, 1951, were accepted unconditionally; that the payments on October 1, 1951, and October 31, 1951, were made in
the afternoon of those days,· after the grace period
had expired; that Appellant never tendered back to
Respondent any premiums. No waiver exists by
reason of such circumstances.
The policy became effective on March 31, 1951,
at noon. That the premium was paid and the policy
issued later that day is of no consequence. Had the
policy been dated the following day Respondent
woud not have been covered by insurance until Noon
of the following day. Undoubtedly it was to the
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advantage of Respondent to have immediate coverage and that i'S why the policy was dated on the date
of the payment of the premium. No inference
arises from this incident that a pattern of accepting
premiums late was established.
Respondent contends the premium on October
1, 1951, was paid in the afternoon of said day.
There is nothing even in Respondent's so-called
"fuller Statement of Facts" which specifies the time
of day when the premium was paid. Whether paid
in the forenoon or afternoon, makes no difference.
If paid in the forenoon Appellant was obligated to
accept the premium as the grace period had not expired. If it was paid in the afternoon Appellant had
the legal right to accept the payment and apply it to
the Se.ptember coverage. Respondent enjoyed coverage during the month of September, which Appellant
was entitled to be compensated for. The authorities
hold that even in the event of forfeiture the insured
is not relieved of the obligation to pay for the period
the policy is in force. 44 C. J. S. 1331, Mass.
Union Mut. Casualty Ins. Corporation, v. Insurance
Budget Plan, 195 N. E. 903, 291 Mass. 62, 98 A. L.
R. 1422. Mo.-General Service Corporation vs. Allhoff Bros., App., 139 S. W. 2d 1062. Neb.-Bleicher
v. Heeter 4 N. W. 2d 897, 141 Neb. 787. N. Y.
Great American Indemnity Co., v. Greenberg Bros.
Iron & Steel Corporation, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 656, 170
Misc. 489-Commercial Casualty Co. v. Rice, 157
N. Y. S. 1, 93 Misc. 567.
The payment of $12.00 on October 31, 1951,
was made in the afternoon of said day, but after
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the accident had occurred. Appellant applied $6.00
of that amount to the October coverage and the remaining $6.00 was used to reinstate the policy.
However, the policy could be reinstated only according to its terms:
"REINSTATEMENT. The right of the
sured to have the policy reinstated after
fault in the payment of a premium, and
rights under the policy as reinstated, .are
termined by the provisions of the policy."
C. J. S. Page 558.

in-:

de~

his
de45

The only limitation on reinstatement was that
it covered accidental injury thereafter sustained.
(Italics ours.)
The policy does not require a new application
or evidence of insurability in order to effect a rein-statement. No reason existed to alter the ·date of
coverage if reinstatement occurred on the last day
of the month which had always been the date determining monthly coverage. The policy having been
reinstated there was no occasion to tender ·back any
premiums to Respondent.
The cases cited by Respondent are not in point
and have no application to the case at bar.
In Ellerbeck, vs. Continental Casualty Company, 63 Utah 530, 227 Pac. 850, the insurance company had forwarded statements to the insured demanding payment of the annual premium. There
had been a conversation between a representative
of the insurance company and the insured wherein
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a credit arrangement had been granted by the company to the insured and the company had accepted
a partial payment of the premium for the period
in question.
In Loftis, vs. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company, 38 Utah 532, 114 Pac. 134, arrangements had been made with the employer of the insured to deduct premiums from his wages. The
insurance company submitted a list to the employer
containing the names of policy holders and the
amount of premiums owing for the months involved.
It was made to appear that the insurance company
kllew other employees who had not earned sufficient
wages each month to pay insurance premiums
promptly when due. Several instances of default
of payment had occurred, which the insurance company had disregarded. The company had demanded
and received payment of premium and treated them
as though they had been timely paid.
In Vinther, vs. Sunset Mutual Life Insurance
Company, 53 Pac. 182 (Cal.) it was made to appear
that ten payments had been made late and accepted
by the company, one of which was as much as 38
days late.
In Sullivan, vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 91 Utah 405, 64 Pac. 2d 351, the wife of the
insured was told before the expiration of the grace
period by a representative of the company that
"When Mr. Sullivan sends the money to you, bring
it in." She was also told it would be all right to bring
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it in after the grace period expired, and was also
advised that in case the money does not arrive for
some time she could take an application for reinstatement form and have Mr. Sullivan fill it out and
bring it in when he returned home.

In Watkins, vs. Brotherhood of American Yoemen (Mo.) 176 S. W. 516, it was made to appear
that it was the practice of the company to permit
payments to be made after the due date in 80% to
90% of the cases and in such instances to reinstate
the policy.
In Bonnot, vs. Grand Lodge Brotherhood ~f
R. R. Trainmen (Mo.) 81 S. W. 2d 360, the Court
found the company had waived a forfeiture where
it was shown the Treasurer of its local lodges had
been permitted to accept premiums late.
In Knarston, vs. Manhattan Life Insuran·ee
Company (Cal.) 56 Pac. 773, it was made to appear
that a general agent had granted a ten day ex·
tention and had attempted to collect the premium
on two occasions after the ten days had elapsed and
the general agent had testified that he would have
accepted the premium had it been tendered to him
on the date of the death of the insured.
In Huber, vs. New York Life Insurance Company (Cal.) 63 Pac. 2d 318, it was held that the
company was estopped under the circumstances to
deny that an agent to whom payment had been made
within the time allowed by the policy had authority
to collect the premium.
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The test of waiver is stated by this Court in
Ballard, vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 82
Utah 1, 21 Pac. 2d 847, as follows:
"Insurance company which, by any course of
conduct, induces in mind of insured honest belief, reasonably founded, that strict compliance
with stipulation for prompt payment of premiums will not be insisted on, waives right
to forfeiture for nonpayment."
According to this test none of the elements of
waiver exists in the case at bar. No "course of conduct" was "reasonably founded" which could have
induced in the mind of Respondent an honest belief
that strict compliance would not be insisted upon.
There is no question but what all payments prior to
October 1st had been made within the grace period.
There is nothing in the record to show that the October 1st payment was not made within the grace
period. Assuming the October 1st payment to have
been made in the afternoon of that day such does
not establish a "course of conduct" upon which
waiver can be predicated. None of the cases cited by
Respondent so hold, and such is not the law.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY AND BOYER
Attorneys for Appellant
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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